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RICHARD ALLEN* 
In 2001, the State of Alaska reinforced an already strong public 
policy in favor of victims’ rights by creating the Office of Victims’ 
Rights, a state-level agency charged with representing crime 
victims in and out of court.  However, in an important recent 
decision, Cooper v. District Court, the Alaska Court of Appeals 
greatly limited the Office of Victim’s Rights’ role in court 
proceedings.  This Note gives a detailed analysis of the Court of 
Appeals’ decision in Cooper and addresses the consequences of 
the Cooper decision for the Office of Victim’s Rights.  It considers 
several possible courtroom roles for the Office of Victim’s Rights 
which likely remain legal under Cooper and concludes by 
recommending that the Alaska Legislature act to clarify the role of 
the Office of Victim’s Rights in the court system. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
For most of the history of criminal justice in the United States, 
criminal proceedings have been perceived as a transaction between 
the offender and the state.  Since the 1970s, however, legislators 
and other policymakers have paid greater attention to the human 
cost of crime and its continuing effects on the lives of crime 
victims.1  Crime victims have mounted campaigns to win 
recognition for their concerns, and legislators have responded by 
 
 1. See Chief Justice Richard Barajas & Scott Alexander Nelson, The 
Proposed Crime Victims’ Federal Constitutional Amendment: Working Toward a 
Proper Balance, 49 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 2 (1997). 
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making efforts to enumerate the rights of crime victims through 
statutes and state constitutional amendments.2 
States have struggled to decide how to enforce victims’ rights.  
Not only do many victims not know their rights, but they are often 
unsure of how to assert them, since it is well-established that 
victims are not parties to criminal proceedings.3  In sorting through 
these issues, crime victims are additionally unsure of where they 
may turn for assistance. 
Alaska’s legislature took a bold step toward resolving these 
uncertainties in 2001 by establishing the Office of Victims’ Rights 
to enforce the rights that the Alaska’s Victims’ Rights Statute and 
the state constitution’s victims’ rights amendment created.4  The 
Office of Victims’ Rights was intended to function as a 
comprehensive information clearinghouse for crime victims, an 
investigative agency that would examine the procedures of justice 
agencies to ensure they protected victims’ rights, and a public 
interest law firm that would represent victims’ interests in court.5  
To this end, the statute that created the Office of Victims’ Rights 
stated that the Office of Victims’ Rights had “jurisdiction to 
advocate on behalf of crime victims . . . in the courts of the state.”6 
The recent Cooper v. District Court decision, however, has 
called the Office of Victims’ Rights’ assertion of jurisdiction into 
question.7  In Cooper, the Alaska Court of Appeals, construing the 
Alaska Victims’ Rights Amendment for the first time, rejected a 
crime victim’s assertion of the right to intervene in the disposition 
of a criminal case and the Office of Victims’ Rights’ assertion of 
independent standing to file suit on behalf of crime victims.8  Yet, 
the court did not state that crime victims were entirely without 
recourse under Alaska law.9 
The passage of the Alaska Victims’ Rights Amendment 
demonstrates a strong public policy in favor of victims’ rights in 
Alaska.  After Cooper, however, the role of the state’s appointed 
victims’ advocate in court proceedings is an open question.  How 
 
 2. Id. at 5. 
 3. See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 n.6 (1973) (holding that a 
crime victim has no cognizable legal interest in the prosecution of his assailant). 
 4. See Stephen E. Branchflower, The Alaska Office of Victims’ Rights: A 
Model For America, 21 ALASKA L. REV. 259, 262–63 (2004). 
 5. See ALASKA STAT. §§  24.65.100–.250 (2006). 
 6. ALASKA STAT. §  24.65.100(a). 
 7. See Cooper v. Dist. Ct., 133 P.3d 692, 695 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006). 
 8. See id. 
 9. See id. at 711. 
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can the Office of Victims’ Rights serve crime victims in court 
without running afoul of Cooper? 
Part II of this Note offers a brief overview of victims’ rights in 
the United States and in Alaska in particular.  Part III examines 
the reasoning behind the court’s holding in Cooper.  Part IV 
discusses some strengths and weaknesses of the court’s holding.  
Part V investigates several roles for the Office of Victims’ Rights in 
the court system that may be permissible under Cooper.  It 
concludes that the Alaska Legislature should recognize a victim’s 
right to address a court and to alert the court to violations of the 
victim’s procedural rights, and should offer the Office of Victims’ 
Rights the opportunity to undertake this task.  It further concludes 
that pursuing appellate relief is not practical for victims.  Part VI 
reiterates that the Alaska Legislature should pass legislation to 
clearly identify the circumstances under which crime victims may 
assert the rights which are justly theirs under the Alaska 
constitution. 
II.  BACKGROUND:  VICTIMS’ RIGHTS IN ALASKA AND 
NATIONWIDE 
In the 1970s and 1980s, attention began to turn to the role of 
the victim in criminal proceedings.10  In the aftermath of such high-
profile United States Supreme Court decisions as Gideon v. 
Wainwright11 and Miranda v. Arizona,12 which offered new 
protections for the rights of the accused, the public began to 
perceive a comparative lack of protection for the rights of crime 
victims.13  In 1983, the Task Force on Victims of Crime, which 
President Ronald Reagan had appointed the previous year, issued 
a slate of sixty-eight recommendations that became the basis of 
many new federal and local programs and policies.14 
 
 10. See John W. Stickels, Victim Impact Evidence: The Victims’ Right that 
Influences Criminal Trials, 32 TEX. TECH L. REV., 231, 235–36 (2001). 
 11. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection requires the Sixth Amendment’s 
guarantee of assistance of counsel in criminal trials to be extended to all indigent 
defendants in such trials). 
 12. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that, in criminal cases, 
the prosecution may not use statements obtained by law enforcement officers 
after a person has been taken into custody or deprived of his freedom in any 
significant way without employing safeguards that protect that person’s Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination). 
 13. Stickels, supra note 10, at 236. 
 14. Office for Victims of Crime, Crime Victims’ Rights in America: A 
Historical Overview (2005), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/ncvrw/2005/pg4b.html. 
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Many states also responded by passing laws specifically 
delineating and protecting the rights of victims.  In 1981, Wisconsin 
was the only state to have a “Victim’s Bill of Rights.”15  At present, 
thirty-two states include provisions for victims’ rights in their state 
constitutions.16 
In 1995, the National Victims Constitutional Amendment 
Network, a group representing all major victims’ rights 
organizations, proposed specific language to be added to the Sixth 
Amendment and began an effort to amend the United States 
Constitution with provisions for victims’ rights.17  A separate 
victims’ rights amendment to the United States Constitution was 
first formally proposed in 1996.18  The proposed amendment was 
subject to detailed criticism,19 and different versions of such an 
amendment continued to come before the Senate in the following 
years.20  For instance, in 2003 the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee 
on the Constitution approved the Crime Victims’ Rights 
Constitutional Amendment authored by Senators Jon Kyl and 
Dianne Feinstein.21  However, the bill proposing the amendment 
was ultimately rewritten as a federal criminal statute and was 
signed into law in 2004.22  The law established new procedural 
rights for crime victims similar to those established by state victims’ 
rights constitutional amendments.23  A victims’ rights amendment 
to the United States Constitution has yet to be adopted. 
 
 15. Office for Victims of Crime, Paving the Path to Justice (2005), 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/ncvrw/2005/pg4a.html. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Robert P. Mosteller, Victims’ Rights and the Constitution: Moving from 
Guaranteeing Participatory Rights to Benefiting the Prosecution, 29 ST. MARY’S 
L.J. 1053, 1055 (1998). 
 18. See Remarks Announcing Support for a Constitutional Amendment on 
Victims’ Rights, 1 PUB. PAPERS 976 (June 25, 1996). 
 19. See, e.g., Robert P. Mosteller, Victims’ Rights and the United States 
Constitution: An Effort to Recast the Battle in Criminal Litigation, 85 GEO. L.J. 
1691, 1692 (1997). 
 20. See Laura Murphy and Terri Schroeder, American Civil Liberties Union: 
Letter to the Senate Urging Opposition to S.J. Res. 1, the “Victims’ Rights 
Amendment” (Apr. 4, 2003), http://www.aclu.org/crimjustice/victimsrights/10203l 
eg20030404.html. 
 21. See Press Release, Senate Judiciary Subcommittee Approves 
Kyl/Feinstein Crime Victims’ Rights Constitutional Amendment (June 12, 2003), 
http://feinstein.senate.gov/03Releases/r-vicrights-subcomittee.htm. 
 22. Id. 
 23. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a) (Supp. V 2005); see also id. at 1–2.  The statute secures 
for victims: 
(1)  The right to be reasonably protected from the accused. 
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A. The Alaska Victims’ Rights Statute and the Alaska Victims’ 
Rights Amendment 
Alaska first addressed the rights of crime victims in legislation 
passed in 1984 entitled “Rights of Victims, Protection of Victims 
and Witnesses.”24  In 1994, voters passed the Alaska Victims’ 
Rights Amendment, which became section 24 of article I of the 
Alaska Constitution.25  In pertinent part, it states that: 
Crime victims, as defined by law, shall have the following rights 
as provided by law:  [(1)] the right to be reasonably protected 
from the accused through the imposition of appropriate bail or 
conditions of release by the court; [(2)] the right to confer with 
the prosecution; [(3)] the right to be treated with dignity, respect, 
and fairness during all phases of the criminal and juvenile justice 
process; [(4)] the right to timely disposition of the case following 
the arrest of the accused; [(5)] the right to obtain information 
about and be allowed to be present at all criminal or juvenile 
proceedings where the accused has the right to be present; [(6)] 
the right to be allowed to be heard, upon request, at sentencing, 
before or after conviction or juvenile adjudication, and at any 
proceeding where the accused’s release from custody is 
considered; [(7)] the right to restitution from the accused; and 
[(8)] the right to be informed, upon request, of the accused’s 
escape or release from custody before or after conviction or 
juvenile adjudication.26 
 
(2) The right to reasonable, accurate, and timely notice of any public court 
proceeding, or any parole proceeding, involving the crime or of any 
release or escape of the accused. 
(3) The right not to be excluded from any such public court proceeding, 
unless the court, after receiving clear and convincing evidence, 
determines that testimony by the victim would be materially altered if 
the victim heard other testimony at that proceeding. 
(4) The right to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the district 
court involving release, plea, sentencing, or any parole proceeding. 
(5) The reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the Government in 
the case. 
(6) The right to full and timely restitution as provided in law. 
(7) The right to proceedings free from unreasonable delay. 
(8) The right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim’s 
dignity and privacy. 
Id. at § 3771(a)(1)–(8). 
 24. ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.61.010–.900 (2006). 
 25. Branchflower, supra note 4, at 261. 
 26. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 24.  In discussing the Alaska Victims’ Rights 
Amendment, this Note will discuss the rights conferred by the Amendment in 
terms of procedural rights and substantive rights.  The term “procedural rights” 
encompasses:  (1) the imposition of appropriate bail or conditions of release; (2) 
the right to confer; (3) the right to timely disposition of the case; (4) the right to 
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B. The Office of Victims’ Rights 
In 2001, the 22nd Alaska Legislature created a new agency 
called the Office of Victims’ Rights, an agency of the Alaska 
Legislature offering legal services to crime victims.27  Since its 
creation, the Office of Victims’ Rights has provided its clients with 
information, education, investigation, in-court advocacy, and 
support.28 
The Office of Victims’ Rights was established as an inspector 
general’s office under the Alaska Legislature rather than as an arm 
of the executive branch in order to prevent conflicts of interest if 
the Office of Victims’ Rights was called upon to investigate 
criminal justice agencies.29  Giving the Office of Victims’ Rights 
responsibility for the entire spectrum of victims’ rights was also 
intended to prevent conflicts of interest which might have arisen if 
responsibilities for vindicating certain rights were given to 
prosecutors, as they are in some states.30 
The Office of Victims’ Rights was given statutory authority to 
adopt its own regulations concerning procedures for advocating on 
behalf of crime victims, processing complaints, conducting 
investigations, reporting findings, and preventing improper 
disclosure of information obtained through its investigations.31  The 
agency was also given broad authority to collect information and 
was empowered to seek enforcement of information requests in 
superior court if individuals or justice agencies failed to comply 
with its requests.32  The agency was further given the power to 
subpoena individuals to obtain information that might aid in its 
investigations.33 
 
information and the right to be present at all hearings where the accused may be 
present; (5) the right to be heard upon request at sentencing and at parole 
hearings, etc.; and (6) the right to be informed of the accused’s escape or release. 
“Substantive rights” refers to the Amendment’s guarantee of “the right to be 
treated with dignity, fairness and respect.” 
 27. Branchflower, supra note 4, at 263. 
 28. Id. at 264. 
 29. Id. at 263. 
 30. Cf. Gina Warren, Prosecutorial Implications of a Victim’s Right to Be 
Heard: Court Upholds Victim’s Right to Be Heard at Important Criminal Justice 
Hearings, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 1173, 1179–80 (2003) (describing how the Utah 
Supreme Court held in a recent case that a prosecutor was responsible for 
conveying to the court a victim’s request to be heard at a hearing regarding a 
change in plea to a felony charge). 
 31. Branchflower, supra note 4, at 263. 
 32. See id. at 271–72. 
 33. ALASKA STAT. § 12.61.130 (2006). 
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The Alaska Statutes provide that “[t]he victims’ advocate has 
jurisdiction to advocate on behalf of crime victims of felony 
offenses or class A misdemeanors . . . .”34  The Alaska 
Administrative Code also outlines procedures by which a victims’ 
advocate can appear before courts in criminal proceedings.35  These 
statutory provisions led the director of the Office of Victims’ 
Rights to assert in 2004 that: 
[B]ecause the legislature recognized that victims’ statutory or 
constitutional rights could be deprived during a criminal 
prosecution or juvenile proceeding, the legislature granted the 
victims’ advocate broad discretion to decide, given the specific 
circumstances, whether to participate as an independent 
attorney on the victims’ behalf. . . . The Alaska Legislature 
specifically authorized the [Office of Victims’ Rights] to 
represent crime victims before all state tribunals, at any stage of 
the proceedings in criminal cases, in order to ensure that their 
statutory and constitutional rights are protected and enforced.36 
III.  COOPER V. DISTRICT COURT 
A. The Significance of Cooper 
Given the broad authority granted to the Office of Victims’ 
Rights by the Alaska Legislature and Alaska citizens (through a 
constitutional amendment), especially with regard to court 
proceedings, it was inevitable that the scope of the Office of 
Victims’ Rights’ power would come under the Alaska court 
system’s scrutiny.  Although the Alaska Victims’ Rights 
Amendment was added to the Alaska Constitution in 1994, the 
Alaska courts had not construed the amendment prior to Cooper, 
making Cooper in some respects a ground-breaking case. 
B. Cooper’s Factual Background 
Daniel Cooper was initially prosecuted by the Municipality of 
Anchorage for assaulting his wife, Cynthia Cooper.37  Daniel 
Cooper pleaded no contest to misdemeanor assault and received a 
suspended sentence conditioned on satisfactory completion of one 
year of probation.38  Daniel Cooper was required by the conditions 
of his probation to attend counseling, but the court did not 
specifically require him to attend one of the “batterer’s 
 
 34. ALASKA STAT. § 24.65.100(a) (2006). 
 35. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 23, § 20.210(a) (2004). 
 36. See Branchflower, supra note 4, at 279–80. 
 37. Cooper v. Dist. Ct., 133 P.3d 692, 694 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006). 
 38. Id. 
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intervention” programs approved by the Alaska Department of 
Corrections.39  The court instead allowed Daniel Cooper to 
continue with the counseling program he had been participating in 
prior to his sentencing, although the program was not approved by 
the Department of Corrections.40 
Both Cynthia Cooper and the Office of Victims’ Rights 
challenged Daniel Cooper’s sentence, because the district court 
failed to require him to attend a Department of Corrections-
approved batterer’s intervention program.41  Immediately after 
Daniel Cooper’s sentencing, Cynthia Cooper filed an application 
for relief arguing that the counseling portion of Daniel Cooper’s 
sentence was illegal.42  She argued that, as the victim of the crime, 
she had standing under Alaska law to challenge the sentence 
imposed by the district court.43  The Office of Victims’ Rights 
argued that it was independently authorized to appeal Daniel 
Cooper’s sentence, whether or not Cynthia Cooper was found to 
have standing to sue.44 
C. Victims are Not Parties to Criminal Proceedings 
The court began its analysis of the issue of Cynthia Cooper’s 
standing by noting that neither the Alaska Constitution nor the 
Alaska Victims’ Rights statute expressly granted crime victims the 
right to intervene in a criminal case with respect to the charges 
brought, the sentence requested, or the appeal choices made.45 
The court further noted that because the prosecutor in the 
district court case believed that the judge had the discretion to 
decide that Daniel Cooper’s pre-sentencing therapy arrangement 
was sufficient to meet the conditions of the sentence, he declined to 
appeal the sentence on behalf of the Municipality of Anchorage.46  
Cynthia Cooper’s appeal was thus contrary to the declared interest 
of the municipality, since if the sentence were revisited, Daniel 
Cooper might move to withdraw from the plea agreement that the 
municipality had worked to obtain.47 
The court then considered and rejected Cynthia Cooper’s 
arguments that the right to appeal the sentence was implicit in two 
 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 696–97. 
 41. Id. at 695. 
 42. Id. at 697. 
 43. Id. at 695. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 700. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
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rights granted to victims in the Alaska Victims’ Rights 
Amendment—the right to a timely disposition of the case and the 
right to be heard at a sentencing hearing.48 
D. A Victim’s Right to a Timely Disposition of a Case Is Not 
Violated Where the Defendant Has Been Sentenced 
In arguing that she had a right to appeal Daniel Cooper’s 
sentence, Cynthia Cooper cited appellate court decisions which 
held that illegal sentences are not meaningfully imposed.49  Cynthia 
Cooper argued that since Daniel Cooper’s sentence was not 
meaningfully imposed he was never meaningfully sentenced, thus 
depriving Cynthia of her right to a timely disposition of the case.50  
The court flatly rejected this argument, stating that even if an 
element of the sentence had been illegal, the fact that Daniel 
Cooper had been sentenced to any extent meant that the case had 
proceeded in a timely manner within the meaning of the Victims’ 
Rights Amendment.51  Therefore, Cynthia Cooper’s right to a 
timely disposition of the case had not been violated.52 
E. Victims May Have Standing to Vindicate Procedural Rights 
The court next considered Cynthia Cooper’s argument that a 
victim’s constitutional right to be heard at sentencing presupposes 
a right to appeal if the victim believes the court has imposed an 
illegal sentence.53 
Rather than addressing this broader question, the court 
examined the record and determined that all of Cynthia Cooper’s 
cognizable procedural rights under the Victims’ Rights 
Amendment—her rights to receive notice of proceedings, to attend 
the proceedings, and to be heard at the proceedings—had been 
vindicated.54  The court found she had received notice of the 
proceedings, had attended those proceedings, and had made her 
views known to the court, both individually and through her lawyer 
from the Office of Victims’ Rights.55  Since none of Cynthia 
Cooper’s procedural rights had been violated, the court stated it 
would not decide the question of whether crime victims have 
 
 48. Id. at 700–06. 
 49. Id. at 700. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 701–06. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 702. 
 55. Id. 
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standing to sue to enforce procedural rights under the Alaska 
Constitution or the Alaska Victims’ Rights statute.56 
Instead, the court decided the narrower question of whether a 
victim whose procedural rights have been vindicated has standing 
to appeal based solely on her disagreement with the offender’s 
sentence.57  The court reviewed a number of state court decisions 
from around the country and found that no other state court had 
recognized that a victim had standing to appeal in such 
circumstances.58  The court concluded that “the law does not 
guarantee crime victims a right to attack the sentencing decision if 
the judge fails to adhere to the crime victim’s views regarding the 
proper sentence.”59 
F. A Crime Victim’s Constitutional Right to Fairness Does Not 
Encompass a Right to Appeal Substantive Decisions by a Trial 
Court 
In addition to its procedural provisions, the Alaska Victims’ 
Rights Amendment guarantees crime victims “the right to be 
treated with dignity, respect, and fairness during all phases of the 
criminal and juvenile justice process.”60  The court rejected Cynthia 
Cooper’s argument that the amendment’s guarantee of fairness 
“must encompass the right to insist on enforcement of all of the 
provisions of the Alaska Statutes that speak to the interests of 
crime victims.”61  In doing so, the court cited recent legislative 
history, noting that the legislature had taken no action on a bill that 
would have granted crime victims broad rights to petition courts to 
vindicate their constitutional and statutory rights.62  Instead, the 
legislature had passed more modest measures securing crime 
victims only one specific right—the right to appeal sentences that, 
due to mitigating factors, were reduced below the presumptive 
sentencing range for the crime in question.63  The court concluded 
that the legislature had chosen not to grant victims either 
independent party status or “an extensive independent right to 
litigate.”64 
 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 702–03. 
 58. Id. at 703. 
 59. Id. at 706. 
 60. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 24. 
 61. Cooper, 133 P.3d at 708–09. 
 62. Id. at 709 (discussing H.B. 55, § 3, 24th Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 2005)). 
 63. Id. (discussing ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.120(f) (2006)). 
 64. Id. at 709. 
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G. The Office of Victims’ Rights Does Not Have Independent 
Standing to File Suit on Behalf of Crime Victims 
Despite the Office of Victims’ Rights’ mandate to “assist crime 
victims in obtaining the rights [that] crime victims are 
guaranteed,”65 the Cooper court was unwilling to separate the 
Office of Victims’ Rights’ role in court proceedings from that of the 
crime victim, stating that, even if an attorney is employed by a 
public agency, “the attorney’s authority to file a lawsuit is merely 
an extension of the client’s authority to do so.”66  The court instead 
concluded that the legislature intended the Office of Victims’ 
Rights’ authority to “advocate”67 and “assist”68 to extend only to 
the Office’s express authority to “publicly criticize a government 
agency if the Office believes that the agency has violated a crime 
victim’s rights.”69  Therefore, the Office of Victim’s Rights cannot 
advocate and assist a victim in exercising rights the victim does not 
have.70 
H. The Office of Victims’ Rights is Analogous to the Office of the 
Ombudsman 
The Cooper court noted that the Office of Victims’ Rights’ 
statutory investigative and reportorial duties are analogous to 
those of another state agency, the Office of the Ombudsman, which 
is empowered to investigate and report on state government offices 
if it appears a citizen has been treated unfairly or unreasonably.71  
The court concluded that because the provisions creating the two 
agencies were similar, “the legislature intended the Office of 
Victims’ Rights to act as a special ombudsman in the area of 
victims’ rights.”72  The court further reasoned that since the 
legislature did not expressly give the Office of the Ombudsman 
independent ability to intervene in a criminal proceeding or to 
appeal its result, the legislature did not intend to give the Office of 
Victims’ Rights that ability either.73  The court cited the Model 
Ombudsman Act for State Governments as additional authority for 
 
 65. ALASKA STAT. § 24.65.110(a) (2006). 
 66. Cooper, 133 P.3d at 712. 
 67. ALASKA STAT. § 24.65.100(a). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Cooper, 133 P.3d at 712. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 713–14. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
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its conclusion that the Office of Victims’ Rights does not have 
independent ability to intervene or appeal.74 
IV.  DISCUSSION OF THE COURT’S HOLDING IN COOPER 
A. The Role of the Office of Victims’ Rights’ Is Not Analogous to 
that of the State Ombudsman 
There are clear justifications for the court’s insistence on 
limiting the reach of the Office of Victims’ Rights to the 
ombudsman-like powers established under statute.  Primary among 
them, as the court indicated, is the victim’s third-party status which 
leaves the victims’ advocate, despite his mandate to advocate on 
the part of the victim, without a clear role in the courtroom.  Under 
this view, implicit in Cooper, it is the court’s job to enforce victims’ 
rights laws governing trial procedure as much as it is to enforce any 
other state law,  The Office of Victims’ Rights would better serve 
the citizens of Alaska by monitoring the justice system for abuses 
of victims’ rights and reporting violations of the system to the 
executive branch and to the public rather than sending victims’ 
advocates to trial and forcing individual judges to decide what role 
they may or may not play.  Implicit in this determination is the 
possibility that any unprecedented intervention in court 
proceedings by the victims’ advocate or the crime victim could 
jeopardize a conviction or give a defendant additional grounds for 
appeal.  Such an outcome would certainly be contrary to the 
victim’s interests.  It is highly unlikely that a victim would chance 
seeing an offender go free merely to enforce a procedural right.75 
Even so, it does not follow from the structure of the 
amendment and statutes that the Alaska Legislature primarily 
intended the Office of Victims’ Rights to play the role of an 
ombudsman.  The most obvious criticism of the Cooper court’s 
conclusion that the Office of Victims’ Rights’ authority is strictly 
analogous to that of the Office of the Ombudsman is that there is a 
clear distinction between the clientele of the Office of the 
Ombudsman, which works on behalf of a broad range of citizens 
who have been treated “unfairly or unreasonably,”76 and that of the 
 
 74. Id. at 713 (Under the terms of the Model Act, “the ombudsman has no 
power to coerce government agencies to take action, nor the power to sue 
government agencies in court . . . .”). 
 75. See Nikki Morton, Cleaning Salt From the Victim’s Wound: Mandamus as 
a Remedy for the Denial of a Victim’s Right of Allocution, 7 TEX. WESLEYAN L. 
REV. 89, 96 (Fall 2000). 
 76. Cooper, 133 P.3d at 713. 
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Office of Victims’ Rights, which is limited to those who have been 
victims of serious crimes—felonies or first-degree misdemeanors.77 
Given that the Office of the Ombudsman’s scope of operation 
may not encompass criminal proceedings at all, and the Office of 
Victims’ Rights’ scope of operation explicitly includes criminal 
proceedings,78 it does not follow from the fact that the Office of the 
Ombudsman does not have the authority to intervene in criminal 
proceedings that the Office of Victims’ Rights also lacks such 
authority.  The legislature may well have expected that the task of 
enforcing these citizens’ rights might involve circumstances of 
greater urgency or seriousness and would be undertaken with an 
eye towards the wrongs the victims had already suffered.  Being 
wronged by a criminal court is different from being wronged by 
another state agency, especially when, in order to come within the 
court’s purview, one has already had to have been wronged by an 
offender. 
B. Dangers of Denying the Office of Victims’ Rights a Role in 
Court Proceedings 
Fundamental grounds for a courtroom role for the Office of 
Victims’ Rights may be found in the fact that several of the 
constitutional rights the Office is charged with protecting directly 
involve court proceedings, for instance:  (1) the right to confer with 
the prosecution, (2) the right to be present at all criminal or 
juvenile proceedings where the accused has the right to be present, 
and (3) the right to be heard upon request in instances such as post-
trial sentencing and parole hearings.79  Such rights cannot be fully 
enforced retroactively.  If a crime victim is denied the right to be 
heard at sentencing and the offender is sentenced, that denial of 
rights cannot be rectified at a later date.  If a crime victim is 
excluded from a trial, that victim will not have another opportunity 
to be present at that trial.  A later investigation and a report by the 
Office of Victims’ Rights cannot protect that victim’s rights—it can 
only serve to prod the courts to do a better job of protecting the 
rights of other victims in the future. 
If the Office of Victims’ Rights were allowed to intervene 
during court proceedings, it is possible that certain rights belonging 
to the victim which otherwise would have been violated could be 
fully protected.  The impossibility of fully enforcing these rights 
retroactively is what led the director of the Office of Victims’ 
 
 77. ALASKA STAT. § 24.65.100(a) (2006). 
 78. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 23 § 20.210(a) (2002). 
 79. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 24. 
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Rights to conclude, prior to Cooper, that “the legislature 
recognized that victims’ statutory or constitutional rights could be 
deprived during a criminal prosecution [and] granted the victims’ 
advocate . . . discretion . . . to participate as an independent 
attorney on the victims’ behalf.”80 
V.  UNANSWERED QUESTIONS AFTER COOPER 
A. How May Crime Victims Enforce Rights? 
The aftermath of Cooper has left the Office of Victims’ Rights 
striving to determine its proper role at trial.  The Office of Victims’ 
Rights’ annual report for 2006 notes that: 
[T]he fallout from the Cooper decision has been extremely 
problematical. Many judges and defense counsel around the 
state have used the decision to deprive the Office of Victims’ 
Rights from filing documents, from being able to be present by 
phone for hearings, from speaking at hearings, and in some 
cases, the office’s attorney’s presence is not even being 
acknowledged by the court.81 
Yet Alaska law clearly states that “[t]he right to 
representation includes the bringing of an action on behalf of a 
crime victim when, in the judgment of the victims’ advocate, the 
action will protect and advance the crime victim’s statutory and 
constitutional victim rights.”82  The Alaska Code was annotated 
after Cooper83 to clarify that the Office of Victims’ Rights does not 
have “an independent right to file lawsuits that the victims 
themselves could not file.”84  Although it recognizes this restriction, 
the Office of Victims’ Rights has asserted that the court’s holding 
in Cooper does not rule out all suits entirely.85  The Office of 
Victims’ Rights’ position remains that when crime victims’ legal 
rights are violated, they are entitled to “limited standing,” which is 
distinct from party status, but which allows the crime victims to 
 
 80. Branchflower, supra note 4, at 279. 
 81. MARY ANNE HENRY, THE OFFICE OF VICTIMS’ RIGHTS ANNUAL REPORT TO 
THE ALASKA LEGISLATURE 10 (2006), http://www.officeofvictimsrights.legis.state.ak. 
us/ovrdocuments/2006_ANNUAL_REPORT.pdf. 
 82. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 23 § 20.210(a) (2002). 
 83. Act of June 16, 2006, ch. 74, § 1, 2006 Alaska Adv. Legis. Serv. P*1 
(LexisNexis). 
 84. Cooper v. Dist. Ct., 133 P.3d 692, 712 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006). 
 85. Henry, supra note 81, at 22 (“[Crime victims and the Office of Victims’ 
Rights] simply wish to exercise their right to limited standing to address violations 
of their constitutional and statutory rights. The Cooper decision does NOT 
prohibit this.”). 
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present their rights in court even in the absence of express 
provisions allowing them to do so.86 
Given the limitations placed upon the Office of Victims’ 
Rights by the Cooper holding, questions remain for both crime 
victims and the Office of Victims’ Rights, whose mission is to assist 
those victims.  What lawsuits can victims file?  Are there other 
avenues crime victims may pursue in court in order to enforce 
procedural rights? 
Part B will examine three possibilities which have been 
employed to differing extents outside of Alaska courts.  Part C will 
then briefly address the significance of the substantive rights of 
dignity, respect, and fairness for crime victims provided by the 
Alaska Victims’ Rights Amendment. 
B. Possible Ways for Alaska Crime Victims to Enforce Their 
Procedural Rights 
Three possibilities which have been employed to differing 
extents outside of Alaska include:  (1) opportunities to address the 
court to alert it to a violation of a procedural right, (2) petitions for 
appellate relief after violations of victims’ procedural rights, and 
(3) petitions for writs of mandamus. 
1. Can Victims Address the Court to Alert it to Procedural 
Violations?  One of the amici curiae in Cooper, the Victim 
Advocacy Research Group, cited a case from the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts, Hagen v. Commonwealth,87 as support for 
its position that the court in that case had recognized a crime 
victim’s standing.88  The Cooper court strongly rejected this 
argument stating that the Hagen court did not grant crime victims 
the right to “independently challenge the rulings of the trial court,” 
but instead merely “[suggested] that crime victims have the right to 
personally address the trial judge before the judge makes decisions 
that involve any of the rights guaranteed under the Massachusetts 
Victims’ Rights Act.”89 
The right granted to victims to address the judge in such 
circumstances in Massachusetts under Hagen may be similar in 
practice to the “limited standing” for which the Office of Victims’ 
Rights has argued.  In Hagen, the crime victim was allowed by the 
trial judge to alert the court through a representative to the matter 
 
 86. Id. 
 87. 772 N.E.2d 32 (Mass. 2002). 
 88. Cooper, 133 P.3d at 704. 
 89. Id. at 705. 
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of a long delay in the disposition of the offender’s case.90  
According to the Hagen court, when the remedy for a violation of a 
victim’s right (here, the right to a prompt disposition) is one only a 
court can provide, the victim should have the right to address and 
alert the court of the violation of the victim’s rights.91 
This decision presents a possible solution to the problem of 
enforcing victims’ rights that are implicitly tied to court 
proceedings.  The victim is still not a party and cannot compel the 
court to act on the victim’s behalf.  Discretion still remains with the 
court.  The victim, however, would be given leave to alert the court 
to a violation of rights, giving the court the opportunity to consider 
a course of action that would address the violation during the court 
proceedings, rather than leaving it to an agency such as the Office 
of Victims’ Rights to issue a report after the fact.  The Office of 
Victims’ Rights’ use of the term “limited standing”92 in asserting 
this right may decrease the likelihood of recognition of this right.  
As the term suggests, this right would be a species of standing 
rather than an informational gesture by the crime victim for the 
court’s benefit, an occurrence in the proceedings somewhat 
analogous to the presentation of the victim impact statement at 
sentencing. 
The fact that the Cooper court did not reject the central 
holding of Hagen suggests that it is possible that the Office of 
Victims’ Rights could be empowered to act similarly to alert courts 
on behalf of its clients without running afoul of the settled principle 
that victims are never parties to criminal proceedings.  The Alaska 
Legislature should remove confusion surrounding this issue by 
establishing a clearly limited right for victims to inform the court of 
violations of procedural rights, leaving the court with full discretion 
over how to redress the violation in question. 
2. Can Victims Seek Appellate Relief if Procedural Rights are 
Violated?  The Cooper court stated that “the executive branch of 
government (as the representative of the community) has the sole 
responsibility and authority to initiate and litigate criminal cases—
and, if necessary, to challenge a trial court’s decisions by seeking 
appellate review.”93  In its review of state court decisions from 
around the country, however, the Cooper court noted that among 
the states with victims’ rights amendments, “many courts are 
prepared to recognize a crime victim’s standing to sue for 
 
 90. Id. 
 91. Hagen, 772 N.E.2d at 38. 
 92. Henry, supra note 81, at 22. 
 93. Cooper, 133 P.3d at 710. 
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enforcement of the procedural rights granted by the victims’ rights 
act—the rights to notice, to attend court proceedings, and to offer 
their views on certain decisions (especially sentencing and parole 
release).”94 
In fact, other states have been even more generous in 
recognizing a crime victim’s right to sue to enforce an entire range 
of rights.  In 2002, for example, the Utah Supreme Court concluded 
in State v. Casey that “(1) . . . crime victims possess the right to 
appeal rulings on motions related to their rights as a victim and (2) 
that an appellate court must review appeals of such a nature.”95  
Utah’s Rights of Crime Victims Act provides that a crime victim 
can sue an individual acting under color of state law as well as the 
state entity which employs that individual if the individual willfully 
or wantonly fails to act to protect the victim’s rights.96  However, 
other state courts have not been as generous in granting crime 
victims the right to appeal.  In Cianos v. State, the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland affirmed a judgment of a lower court holding that 
crime victims could not appeal the trial court’s decision not to 
allow them to speak at an offender’s sentencing because they were 
not parties to the proceeding.97 
The Cooper court declined to decide the question of possible 
appellate relief, stating that “we leave for another day the question 
of whether a crime victim in Alaska has the right to seek appellate 
relief when a lower court fails to honor a crime victim’s procedural 
rights.”98  The Alaska Court of Appeals also declined to decide the 
issue in a recent order, Kalenka v. Volland,99 in which it refused to 
grant an application for relief filed with the court of appeals by the 
father of a murder victim alleging the denial of his constitutional 
right to a prompt disposition of the charges.  Despite its denial of 
relief, the court declined to decide the issue of whether crime 
victims can file motions at the trial court level.100 
 
 94. Id. at 705. 
 95. 44 P.3d 756, 762 (Utah 2002) (holding that the victim had both a statutory 
right under the Rights of Crime Victims Act and a state constitutional right under 
the Utah Constitution’s victims’ rights amendment to be heard at a change of plea 
hearing for a felony charge, which was held to be an “important criminal justice 
hearing” within the language of both the statute and the amendment). 
 96. Warren, supra note 30, at 1177–78. 
 97. 659 A.2d 291, 293–94 (Md. Ct. App. 1995). 
 98. Cooper, 133 P.3d at 711. 
 99. Court of Appeals Order Denying Kalenka’s Original Application for 
Relief at 4, No. A-09575 (Apr. 25, 2006). 
 100. Henry, supra note 81, at 25. 
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The Cooper court clearly rejected the suggestion that victims 
could appeal if the court declined to follow a victim’s or a victim 
advocate’s independent conclusions about the facts of a case or 
suggestions about how to dispose of a case.101  A clear violation of a 
victim’s procedural rights during court proceedings, however, 
might present grounds for appeal.  This possibility, again, raises 
practical considerations about how violations of procedural rights 
could actually be redressed were the victim to win on appeal.  Such 
difficulties are clear in the facts surrounding the Kalenka order; 
even if the court of appeals had found that the trial court had 
violated the victim’s right to a prompt disposition of the charges by 
the time the court had heard the appeal, the date of the murder 
trial, which had been postponed for four months, was only thirty-
five days away.102 
Cianos similarly provides useful perspective on the 
shortcomings of appellate relief for crime victims.  The crime 
victims’ application for leave to appeal makes clear the extent of 
the remedy they had hoped for:  the vacating of the offender’s 
sentence and remand to the trial court for resentencing.103  The 
grounds for the Cianos court’s decision are also instructive.  Rather 
than deciding the issue of whether the crime victims had effectively 
been denied their right to address the court, the court of appeals 
found that a decision on the merits could have no practical bearing 
on the case.  Even if the victims had appealed a decision of the 
court prior to sentencing, they could not have stayed the 
proceeding.104 
Given these examples of the inability of the court system to 
grant meaningful relief to crime victims seeking to appeal 
violations of procedural rights, a right to appeal procedural 
violations will likely not be useful to Alaska crime victims. 
3. May Victims Petition Courts of Appeal for Writs of 
Mandamus?  Early in its opinion, in considering the issue of a 
victim’s standing to challenge a plea bargain agreement, the 
Cooper court cited a passage from Reed v. Becka,105 a South 
Carolina Supreme Court case which held that in South Carolina 
constitutional rights may be enforced via a writ of mandamus.106  
The Cooper court noted that: 
 
 101. See Cooper, 133 P.3d at 705–06. 
 102. See Henry, supra note 81, at 24–25. 
 103. Cianos v. State, 659 A.2d 291, 292 (Md. Ct. App. 1995). 
 104. Id. at 293–94. 
 105. 511 S.E.2d 396 (S.C. 1999). 
 106. Cooper, 133 P.3d at 704. 
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[S]ome courts have recognized a crime victim’s right to pursue 
litigation seeking relief in the nature of mandamus (i.e., an 
appellate court order directing a lower court to follow the law) 
when a lower court fails to honor the procedural rights given to 
crime victims by state constitution or by  state statute. This issue 
is not raised in the present case.107 
Could writs of mandamus be used in Alaska courts to enforce 
victims’ procedural rights?  Alaska’s rules of civil procedure no 
longer technically recognize the writ of mandamus.108  Instead, 
Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 91 provides that “[r]elief 
heretofore available by mandamus as prescribed by statutes may be 
obtained by appropriate action or by appropriate motion under the 
practice prescribed in these rules.”109  Alaska courts thus recognize 
actions to compel civil courts to enforce the law which resemble 
mandamus; although mandamus is infrequently employed in a 
criminal law setting,110 there is no indication that courts would not 
similarly recognize such actions in criminal proceedings. 
Precedent indicates that the Alaska Legislature may 
statutorily approve additional petitions for review for crime victims 
that in other states would be characterized as petitions for writs of 
mandamus.  An Alaska Court of Appeals decision referred to a 
“petition for writ of mandate” (equivalent to a writ of mandamus) 
filed in the California Court of Appeal as “the equivalent of our 
petition for review.”111  The one instance in which the Alaska 
Legislature has specifically recognized a crime victim’s ability to 
pursue an action in court—when an offender has been sentenced 
below the sentencing range for the crime—refers to the prospective 
action as a “petition for review.”112  Accordingly, the situations in 
which crime victims in other states may pursue mandamus as a 
remedy are relevant to this discussion. 
Crime victims have petitioned for writs of mandamus to 
compel courts to enforce procedural rights in other forums with 
varying degrees of success.  In United States v. McVeigh,113 family 
members of the victims of the Oklahoma City bombing 
unsuccessfully petitioned for a writ of mandamus in federal court in 
an attempt to compel the district court judge to allow them to be 
 
 107. Id. at 711. 
 108. ALASKA R. CIV. PROC. 91 (2006). 
 109. Id. 
 110. See 63C AM. JUR. 2D Prosecuting Attorneys § 21 (2006). 
 111. DeNardo v. Anchorage, 938 P.2d 1099–1100 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997). 
 112. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.120 (2006) (“The victim of the crime for which a 
defendant has been convicted and sentenced may file a petition for review in an 
appellate court of a sentence that is below the sentencing range for the crime.”). 
 113. 106 F.3d 325 (10th Cir. 1997). 
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present at all public court hearings regarding the case.114  Recently, 
however, in Kenna v. United States District Court,115 the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals granted a writ of mandamus to a victim 
who had been denied the right to speak in open court at an 
offender’s sentencing; the court found that he had been denied his 
right to be “reasonably heard” under the federal Crime Victims’ 
Rights Act and remanded the case back to district court.116 
Mandamus is a flexible equitable remedy.  Given those 
qualities, the fact that the Cooper court declined to rule out 
mandamus as a remedy means it may be a future avenue for 
obtaining equitable relief for violations of procedural rights in 
court proceedings.  The holding in Kenna supports this analysis.  
However, mandamus is regarded as an extraordinary remedy, one 
of “last resort.”117  Crime victims are not entirely deprived of 
grounds for a petition for review, which undercuts the need for an 
extraordinary remedy.  The Alaska Legislature has so far 
recognized one basis for a petition for review—where a sentence 
falls below a mandatory sentencing range.  It is thus possible that 
after Cooper, Alaska courts will recognize only that basis for 
review under Alaska Statute section 24.65.210.  The issue may be 
clarified soon.  In 2005, a bill was introduced in the Alaska 
Legislature which would create a statute giving crime victims the 
right to file petitions for review and to appeal the court’s decisions 
regarding those petitions.118  At the time of the Cooper decision, the 
legislature had yet to act on the bill.119 
C. How Will the Right to Dignity, Fairness, and Respect be 
Protected Under the Alaska Victims’ Rights Amendment? 
In addition to procedural rights, the Alaska Victims’ Rights 
Amendment gives crime victims the substantive right to be treated 
with “dignity, respect and fairness.”120  Alaska is not alone in doing 
so; fifteen other states’ victims’ rights amendments also use these 
terms, and eight of those states statutorily define one or more of 
these terms.121 
 
 114. Paul G. Cassell, Barbarians at the Gates? A Reply to the Critics of the 
Victims’ Rights Amendment, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 479, 517 (1999). 
 115. 435 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 116. Id. at 1018.  The court also ruled that “reasonably heard” means the victim 
has a right to speak in open court.  Id. at 1015. 
 117. 52 AM. JUR. 2D Mandamus § 4 (2006). 
 118. H.B. 55, § 3, 24th Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 2005). 
 119. Cooper v. Dist. Ct., 133 P.3d 692, 709 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006). 
 120. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 24. 
 121. Branchflower, supra note 4, at 262. 
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Some courts in other states have employed similar guarantees 
of these substantive rights to provide context for interpreting other 
rights of victims.  Recently, in State v. Korsen, the Idaho Supreme 
Court found that the Idaho victims’ rights amendment’s guarantees 
of dignity, respect, and fairness, combined with specific statutory 
provisions for restitution for crime victims, demonstrated a strong 
public policy against allowing abatement ab initio of charges 
against a defendant who had been convicted of kidnapping but 
died before his appeal was heard.122  In Salt Lake City v. Johnson,123 
the Utah Court of Appeals also invoked Utah’s constitutional 
“Declaration of the Rights of Victims” and its guarantee of 
“fairness, respect, and dignity” in affirming the decision of a trial 
court to dismiss a domestic violence charge at the request of the 
crime victim despite the opposition of the municipality of Salt Lake 
City.124  In Cianos, even though the Maryland Court of Appeals 
concluded that crime victims did not have standing to appeal after 
a possible violation of the right to be heard at sentencing, the court 
cited Maryland’s crime victims’ bill of rights’ guarantee of “dignity, 
respect and sensitivity” as support for the proposition that “trial 
judges must give appropriate consideration to the impact of crime 
upon the victims.”125  The Cianos court thus made the equitable 
determination that because the crime victims had arguably been 
denied a statutory right, they would be relieved of the 
responsibility of the court costs of their appeal.126 
Not all state courts have concluded that these guarantees 
apply in the same circumstances.  In a case with facts similar to 
Korsen, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the Illinois Crime 
Victims’ Rights Amendment’s guarantee of “fairness and respect 
for [victims’] dignity and privacy throughout the criminal justice 
process”127 was not relevant, and that the amendment had “neither 
application nor reference to the abatement of criminal 
prosecutions.”128 
The Cooper court rejected Cynthia Cooper’s assertion that the 
Alaska Victims’ Rights Amendment’s guarantee of fairness 
granted crime victims the right to override the discretion of the 
trial court and insist upon enforcement of all other applicable 
victims’ rights provisions.  Aside from Cooper, there have been no 
 
 122. State v. Korsen, 111 P.3d 130, 134–35 (Idaho 2005). 
   123.  959 P.2d 1022 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
 124. Id. at 1023. 
 125. Cianos v. State, 659 A.2d 291, 295 (Md. Ct. App. 1995). 
 126. Id. 
 127. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1(a)(1). 
 128. People v. Robinson, 719 N.E.2d 662, 663 (Ill. 1999). 
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other cases construing the meaning of these terms in Alaska.129  
Whether Alaska courts will choose to view the guarantee of 
“dignity, respect, and fairness” as merely a statement of ideals or as 
an enforceable right with practical applications has not yet been 
decided.  As in Korsen and Cianos, these words should serve as a 
further reminder to judges of Alaska’s strong public policy in favor 
of victims’ rights. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Cooper represents an important definition of the landscape of 
victims’ rights in Alaska.  The Office of Victims’ Rights will 
continue to play a unique role as a state agency, but the Alaska 
Court of Appeals has made clear that the Office of Victims’ Rights’ 
standing to intervene in criminal proceedings is no different than 
that of any other third party.  Further, the court clearly and 
concretely stated its conclusion that the Office of Victims’ Rights is 
intended primarily to play the role of an ombudsman.  Although 
this conclusion is not authoritative, it has already had consequences 
for the day-to-day operations of the Office of Victims’ Rights, as 
noted in Part V. 
The doors of the court are not completely closed to crime 
victims in Alaska.  As discussed above, opportunities may remain 
for victims to address trial courts to alert those courts to procedural 
violations, to seek appellate relief for violations of procedural 
rights, and to file petitions for writs of mandamus. 
The first avenue, leave to alert courts to violations, is the most 
promising, as it would allow victims to assert their rights at trial 
without interfering with the discretion of the court.  Accordingly, 
the Alaska Legislature should remove confusion surrounding this 
issue by establishing a clearly limited right for victims to inform the 
court of violations of procedural rights. 
Appellate relief for procedural violations raises substantial 
procedural difficulties, chief among them the high likelihood that 
many issues would be mooted before appeals could be pursued, 
making appeal a comparatively unattractive means of redress. 
The possibility of Alaska courts granting petitions for writs of 
mandamus cannot be ruled out as a last resort.  A possible new 
statute outlining grounds by which crime victims could petition for 
review is before the legislature, but the legislature has yet to act on 
it. 
The Alaska Legislature went to great lengths to establish the 
statutory and constitutional rights of crime victims under state law.  
 
 129. Id. at 709. 
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By establishing the Office of Victims’ Rights, it became a leader in 
victims’ rights education and evidenced a strong commitment to 
ensuring that victims’ rights would be protected by all the agencies 
of state government.  But the issue of how victims’ rights will be 
enforced in court remains open.  The legislature should do crime 
victims the favor of clarifying the means by which these important 
rights will be enforced. 
